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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

2\lAH Y

STATE OF UTAH
lHl~'l'A

CROFTS

'

Plaintiff and App<'llant,
vs .

No. 11165

.JOSLAH HOY'l' CROFTS,
Defendant and Rl'spo11d1d.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NA'l'URE OF THE CASE
'L'his is an action for divorce, in which Appellant
seeks a review and reversal by the Utah Supreme Court
of a Deelaratory Judgment enkred herein by the Sixth
District Court for Garfield County, Utah, on a Petition
filed b)' Appellant for an inkrpretation of the Decree
of Divorce entPred herein and for an Accounting by the
Hespondent.

OISPOSI'l'ION BY THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
FOR OARFIELD COUNTY, UTAH
Th<> lower Court entered a Declaratory Judgment
b,\ which it determined (a) that Respondent owed Plaintiff $4,5G:3.84; (h) that the $10,000.00 awarded Appellant
hy the Dt>cree of Divorce was in lieu of all other interests
of Appellant in any property including the rights of the
partiPs in a home in Salt Lake City which had been sold
and a tract of land in Pangnitch, Utah; ( c) that said
$10,000.00 amotmt wm; payable in im;tallments at such
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tjme m; there were actually (listribukd to and receiwd
by Respondent profits from the sale of business asseb
and that interest did not accrue prior to actual n'ceipt
by Respondent of such amounts and that the said $10,000.0() awarded was not a judgment hearing interest; and
l d) that the Decree of Divorce insofar as it vertained to
the equities of the parties in the home property at Panguitch was to be construed to call for a division and di~
tribution equally between the parties onl~· after all cos to
of sale and all outstanding indebtPdnesses against th(•
residence had been fully satisfied.
NATURE OF RELL1£F SOUGHrl' ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks to have the Utah Supreme
Court reverse the Declaratory Judgment of the lower
Court in connection with the disallowance by the lower
Court of interest on the $10,000.00 amount awarded tu
Appellant, the determination of the lower Court with
respect to the balance due thereon to the Appellant,
including the allowance by the said Court of credits
thereon to which the Respond(mt was not entitled, the
holding of the lower Court with respect to "equities"
in the Panguitch home property of the parties, and the
failure and refusal of the lower Court to require Respondent to account to Appellant and to supply her with
data covering sale of business assets and receipts of
profits from business interests.
STATEMEN'l' OF FACTS
A prwllant brought an adion in OdobPr, 1~W2. in the
Nixth J ndicial Distrid Court for Uarfit>ld Count~·. Ptal1.
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sPeking a divorce from Re::;1wndent, a division of propertie::;, child custody, support money and alimony, and
attorney'::; fee::; (R. 1-2). The partie::; ::;igned a General
.:\ ppearance of Defendant, Waiver and Agreement dated
October ................ , 1962 (R. 3, 4, 5) and after the case
wa::; heard by the Court on October 16, 1962, (R. 6 to
28, hoth inclnsive), there was filed on Nov. 5, 1962, a
Ot>neral Appearance of Defendant, vY aiver and Amended
Agn~ernent (R. 29, 30, 31) dated October 16, 1962. Finding::; of Fact and Conclusion::; of Law (R. 35, 3fi, 37) and
a Decree of Divorce (R. 38, 39, 40) were filed November
:,, 1%2, bearing date of October 16, 1962. The said De('J'ee of Divorce i::; set forth verbatim as an Appendix at
the end of the instant Brief.

By it::; Decree of Divorce, tlw lower Court, after di::;sol\'ing- the bonds of rnatrimon.v and awarding child
cw.;tod~- to Amwllant, continued as follows (R. 38, 39):
"I'l1 IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that the Defendant shall as::mme, pay, and discharge all of the outstanding
family obligations of the parties hereto, including
the outstanding note and mortgage upon the home
property owned by the parties."
'l 1 he home property ref erred to was and is a certain home
at Panguitch, rtah, owned by the parties as joint tenants,
on ~which one and only one mortgage debt existed at the
timt> of said Decree, this being in favor of Federated
~<>curity Life Insurance Company (R. Hi, 96, 294).

"B'ollowing provisions relativ(' to alirnon~· an<l sup1,ort ltlUlH"Y tlw Comt decreed a::; follows (H. 39):

.'
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4
"'I'l' IS. FURTHER OHD1~1{1£D, AD.JUDG1£D
AND DECREI<JD that the Plaintiff is awarded a:a permanent, complete and final settlement of ht>r
rights in the property of the Defendant the total
su~ of $10,000.00, which sum shall be paid by the
Defendant to the Plaintiff out of 1n·ofits arisino
from business interests held by the Defendant and
which profits are actually distributed and received
by the Defendant and shall be immediately due
and payable out of the sale of hm;iness ass~ts of
the Defendant to third parties and actual n~cei1Jt
by the Defendant of said salt> prnceeds. Said
amount shall be pa~·able at the rate of 50 per cent
of the gross sal(:'s proceeds until said $10,000.00
has been paid in full. Fmther, the Defendant shall
have the option of prepaying any part of the
amount provided herein."
Then followed provisions in the Decree of Divorce n)a.
tive to an automobile, furniture and furnishings, and the
possession, use and occupancy of tlw Panguitch home.
described as containing 4.2 acres, more or less, (R. ::!~,
40) and then followed this lJrovision (R. 40):
". . . In the event the home is sold to a third
party, the equities realized from the sale of said
property are to be equally divided between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant. The home property
shall be continued in joint ownership between the
Plaintiff and Defendant until said ownership i~
terminated by a sale to a third party as is hen•i11
provided."
Appellant's Petition for Interpretation of Decree of
Divorce and to Have Ddendant Render an Accounting
(R. 42, 43, 44, 45) sought an interpretation by the Court
of the Decree of Divorce and that it determine (a) that
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in vil,W of the fact that Hespondent was ordered to pay
all outstanding family obligations, including the outstanding note and mortgage upon the home property, that said
mortgage debt should not be deductible from gross sale
proceeds of the Panguitch home in making a division of
such proceeds between the parties; ( b) that Plaintiff was
entitled to eight (8) per cent interest on the $10,000.00
awarded to her by the Decree of Divorce from the date
of the entry thereof until said smn was paid; and (c) that
Hespondent be ordered to show cause why he should
not account to Appellant for profits arising from business interests held by Respondent and distributed to him
or subject to distribution upon his request and for the
sale of any business interests of Respondent, including
thl• sale price, the proceeds received, and any proceeds
not received but payable to him. An Order to Show
Cause and 8etting Time for Hearing (R. 46, 47, 48) was
i::osued and served pursuant to said Petition.
Various proceedings were then conducted and hearings held, the record and transcripts of which appear
in the Record on Appeal (R. 49 to 311, both inclusive)
and there was then entered an A.MENDED DECISION
(R. 312, 313, 314, 315) dated Nov. 29, 1967. The original
Decision was not filed and of course is not a part of the
Hecord on Appeal. The Court then entered its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 316, 317, 318, 319,
320) and its Declaratory Judgment (R. 321, 322, 323)
from which Judgment tlH• instant appeal was taken by
Appellant.
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A1W Ul\11£NT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE $10,000.00 SUl\l AWARDED APPELLANT BY
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS PAYABLE IN
INSTALLMENTS AT SUCH TIME AS THERE WERE
ACTUALLY DISTRIBUTED TO AND RECEIVED BY
THE RESPONDENT PROFITS FROl\I THE SALE OF
BUSINESS ASSETS, THAT INTEREST THEREON
DID NOT ACCRUE PRIOR TO ACTUAL RECEIPT
BY RESPONDENT OF ANY OF SUCH AMOUNTS,
AND THAT SAID $10,000.00 AWARD WAS NOT A
JUDGMENT.

By ih; Declaratory .J ndgrnrnt, thl' Court stated tl1at
Uw $10,000.00 award \\'as pa>·ahl!· sole!>- ont of "profit:from the sale of business assl'ts" receivl'd h>- tlw Rt'spondent (R. 322). 1'his obviously and flagrantly in conflict with the Decree of Dirnrce thl' prnvisions of "·hich
are 4uoted in the 8taternent of Facts above on this point
and a copy of which is attached hereto as an Appendix.
Certainly, it is trne that nndPr tht> guise of interpreting
a Decree, thP Court is not permitted to completely revise and alter the sanw, bnt this is Pxactly what the lower
Court has done on both this and otlwr points and Jll'OYis1ons.
In connection "·itli tlH· qtwstion as to \\'hetlwr or not
the $10,000.00 award was a jn<lgrnent, bParing interest
from its date at ~~~ ]Jl'r annum \\ P submit that thi'
1:llllOlmt as set forth in thP D<•en~P of Divorce ,,-as and i'
a sum certain and is a jn<lg11H'nt lwaring interest frolll
ifa datP urnkr tlw La\\'s of Ptali. rr11P language of tlw
Dt>cn'<' is significaut:
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"l'I' 1:--l B'UH'l'HJ~R OHD1£Rl£D, ADJUDGED
AND DJ£CREJ£D that the Plaintiff is awarded as
~ pennanPnt and final :,;ettlement of her rights
m the property of the Defendant, the total sum
of $10,000.00 .... " (R. 39).

At thi8 point, could there be any doubt that this was and
is a judgment bearing interesU Additional language followed, but it merely did two things: (1) it specified out
uf what funds or sources the judgment was to be paid,
namely, from all "1Jrofits arising from business interests
held by the Defendant" and 50% of gross sales proceeds
"out of the sale of business assets of the Defendant; and
(2) it gave the Defendant the "option of prepaying any
iiart of the amount provided herein." (R 39). These provisions did not restrict, modify or lessen the effect of,
the award as a sum certain, which would bear interest
at 8% under Utah Statutes.
Rule 54 of the Utah Ritle.s of Civil Procedure proYides as follows:
"Definition: Form. 'Judgment' as used in these
Rules includes a decree and any order from which
an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings the report of a master, or the
record of prior proceedings."

In the case of Robin.soil 'U. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah
;'520, 109, 817, a judgment is defined as follows:
"The statute does not n~qnire a judgment to be
in an~' particular form. Ordinarily a judgme~t
is snfficiPnt if hy the nse of proper language_ it
is stakd what tJH' prp\·ailing party shall n•ceJYP
and what tliL· lo:,;ing party is re(1 uired to do, pay
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
u~· disl'harg1·. and i11 that \\a.' adjudi(·at1·:-: and
(hsposP:-: of thP matkr:-: in eontron·r:-:'""
~ection 15-1-±, Ct uh Code A 111wtutcrl 195:l, lH'o\·i<b

as follows:

011 i11((r;111c11f,, . . . . An> judgmL·nt n·ndered on a lawfnl eontract shall conform thento
and .shall ~ear the inten-'st agrePd upon hy th1·
parties, wluch shall be SJ H'cifi Pd in thP j udgmPnt:
othe1· judg:nwnb shall hPar intPrP:-:t at tht> rah' of
eight iwr et>nt iwr annum."

··Jntcrcst

ln Arnold 1. Arnold. 1-1-0 X\Y~d ~l-1:. at pag(· :--;77
tlH· Iowa ('on rt hdd:

(:11

"\Ve an· satisfiPd fixed a\\ ards of 1110nn for ehil<l
support, alimon.\' and 1n·oiwrt~- st>ttle1;1Pn t dra\\'
interest at fivP J!Pl' <'ent ]'Pl' annum from datP of
jndgmt>nt. 01· in <·asp ol' sjw<.'ifie 1w1·iodie pa»ments, frorn da tP Pa<.'h :-:ueh pa,n1wnt bt><'OlllP~
due and O\\·ing .. (antl10ritiPs) .. ~'urthermore,
this rnle ap]Jlit>:-: p\·pn though thP jndgrnPnt itself
fails to make n•frn·m·p to tli1· matter of intert>st.
PagP ~rnU>) "I\': HaYing ddenuinPd a judgmt>nt
or decrPP in a divorcP action a\\'arding money in
a sum or sums certain or capablt> of a::>cPrtainnwnt from tlw judguwnt or dP<.'l't'!\ draw intert>st
until paid. \\' P 1n·oeePd 1wxt to a eon::>ideration
of the pffpd an ap]H•al llHl>' Jia,·1· upon right to
8\lCh infrl'(-'8t."

The Deel'P!' in tlH· instant ease provides a sulll et>l'·
tai11 and tlwn lllPl'Pl> <'ontin11Ps to prn\·idP for payment
ont of cPrtain som·e(•:-:. lt doPs not makl' the judgrnt>nt
payahlP in instalh11P11ts and in fixPd periodi<· datPs a~
was dorn· with 1·e::;1wd to tlw ali!lloll.' and snpport 1t101w~
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;i\\·ardPd. It is so111t'\\·hat similar to a demonstrativ 1 ~
lq~acy whieh Wordl-' and PhrasPt-', \'ohtme 12, page 6S,
'!Pf i nes as follows:
"A 'dernon::;tratiw legacy' i::; one given with referPn?e .to a particular fund only for purpose::; of
pomtmg out a convenient method of payment and
wherein legatee will not be disappointed though
the fund totally fails. Probate Code Sec. 161. In
re Cline's ~::;tate, 155 P.:2d 390, 393, 67 Cal. App.

2d 800."

One of tlw mo::;t important and significant provisions
of the Decree of Divorce with re::;pect to this question is
found in the provision that the defendant shall have the
u1;tio1l of prepaying a11y part of the amount provided
herein (R. 39). What possible reason could there be for
this provision in favor of the Re::;pondent other than
lo enabh· him to halt the running of intere::;t on the
$10,000.00 awarded Appellant'? If that provision has any
1mrpo::;(~ behind it, and it must be assumed that it was
not included for the pnrpose of being meaningless, then
it was to enable Respondent to avoid further interest by
"prepaying" so that he could use any funds available
(and not mere l~- those from hnsines::; profits or from
:>0% of gro::;s sales proceeds).
rrhe lower Court failed utterly to distinguish between
a prop1·rt~· settlement award and an award of alimony or
support money payable in periodic installments. Certainly, the alimony and support money amounts did not
rlraw interPst at least nntil thPy matured. The cases
110lding that intt·n·d does not apply on award::; in di\'On:e
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ea::-;e::-; are limited in::-;ofar a::-; WP can dt>tPnuiiw, to situation::-; involving 1wriodic in::-;tallment::-; duP as alirnon~ 01
:o-npport money. Bnt that is entirely diff Prent frorn a
property settlement award and/or an award of' alirnon:
in gross and thP courts haw so JH--ld. 1'hP $10,000.011
<.mount is not even alirnon>· in gross, which clearly would
bear interest. It is rnon, than that - it is a ::-;ettlt>111Pnt
and award of Plaintiff's interest in lwr husband's prop
~·rty settlement and is not alimony.
We are fully cognizant that the l~tah ~u1m--1w· Court
has held in Cole v::;. Cole (1942) 101 Utah 355, 122 P2d
201, that periodic alimony and support money in::-;tallments do not bear interest until dut>. Thi::-; part of thl'
ruling in said case is limited to such items payahlt> in
installments and is so constrned in being cited in 33
ALR2d 1457. It is significant and intert>::-;ting to notP that
in the Cole case, the Court goes on to discm;s a propert:
settlement award and uses this language:
"On May 19, 193<i, the de('rel' granting .MargueritP
D. Cole the sum of $1,037.50, being one-half of tlw
value of the couunnnit~- propert~- was t>ntered. Th<'
first payment in the amount of $250, was not madP
until Januan· 19, 1938. Subsequent payment~
were made as heretofore set forth. The amount
having bf~en fixed by decrpe of tlw court, interpst
should be allowed from the date of tht> decree to
thP date tlw ehe<'ks wt>n• dPlivered .... "
In the Decree in the Cole casP, nothing was said
about intert>st. A jndgrnPnt antornatieally bears intPrPst
nndPT thP Utah Code. SPP :-m A111 .•htr (l1iterest) See. :24.
'· :!~~ \\·hi('l1 .-,;tatP~ tlint undn ~1wli a ~tatut(', int .. n·~t
1
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\\·ill he applied or implied although th1· ,judgrnPnt ibwlf i~
silent on the point.

Anoth1c~r l!tah case of importance in our ::;ituation is
Reeslcy i:. Badger, 66 Utah 194, 240 P. 458, in which the
( 'omt considered the Utah Statutes relative to whether
or not a divorce decree vroviding for installment payments of alimony constituted a lien against the property
of the person required to pay. After quoting the Statute
upplieable to judgment liens, the Court held:
''When a divorce is grantt>d and the husband
ordered to pay alimony or to support minor children or both, and the decree itself does not declare
or impress a lien to secure such payments, then,
by force of the statute relating to judgments in
general, such decree or judgment from the filing
and docketing thereof becomes and has all the
force and effect of a lien to the same extent as an
ordinary judgment for money, when the decree
for alimony is in a gross sum, though payablt~
partly or wholly in future installments, and when
not in a gross sum but, as here, in installments for
an indefinite period, the decree is a lien securing
payment of all due and unpaid installments, but
not of installments to become due in the future.
By the weight of authority, and as we think the
better reason, although there are cases to the contrary, a decree for alimony in a gross sum as well
as to past due and unpaid installments stands upon
the same footing as ordinary money judgments.

"

.. .''A judgment or decree awarding '.1-limony in a

grnss sm11 though payahlP in futi.ire 1m;tall11wnt::;,
is neYerthl'le::;::; definite and certam as to the ::;urn
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of morn-'y to lw paid. So ii,; a d!'Cl"\'(' a:,; to iiast-dut·
and unpaid installments ... "

If tlw .Judg11wnt in the Bcc::;lcy cas(• constituted a
lien, then certainly a pro1wrty settle11wnt jndg111Pnt fixing
a certain sum as hPing dnP Appellant, regardless of
sources out of "\Vhich it is to he paid and partieularh
where the judgment debtor has a riirht of lll'eJJaVlllPnt
h
.
'
is a judgment constituting a liPn and hParing intereRt
nnder the Utah Code. From tlH' standpoint of jnstict,
it should be lwld to lw such a jndg·11wnt, parti<'nlarly
where, as in our instant case, the Defendant rdaint>J
all of the business property. 'L'lw award to Ap1it>llant
represented her share in that lJrofit-prodncing business
propert~·, which wali h•pt as an intPgrntt>d mass for
Respondent's benefit. J1~rom this, he would receiw all
benefits and profit8, and A ppdlant'8 only bt>nefit from it
was the accrual of inten•st on the jr;_dgmPnt duP lll'r.
·POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADJUDICATING
THAT THE DECREE OF DIVORCE BE DETERMINED TO MEAN THAT THE EQUITIES IN THE
HOME AT PANGUITCH, UTAH, WERE TO BE DIVIDED AND DISTRIBUTED EQUALLY BETWEEN
THE PARTIES ONLY AFTER ALL COSTS OF SALE
AND ALL OUT ST ANDING I N D E B T E D N E S S
AGAINST SAID HOME WERE FULLY SATISFIED.

It is impo8siblP for App<-·llant to ddt~r111ine the mean·
ing of the lower Court'8 Declarator~· .J ndgment on tlw
que8tion of eqnitie8 in tlw Pangnikh home. We 4uotf·
from 8aid .Judgment (R 322, :323):

"D. Fr TS

that the
DPcrel' of N ovP11tlwr G, 191i:2, is interprPkd and
1

F'lTHTIH~l{ ~\D.JUDICA 1 I<~D
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detenuinPd to mean that the \~qnitie:::; in the home
an• to be_ divided and distributed equally between
the parties only after all costs and expenses of
sal~ and all out:::;tanding indebtedne:::;s against the
residence have been fully :::;atisfied."
Suppo:::;edly, the Declaratory .J ndgment wa:::; an inter11rdation of the Decree of Divorce, but we feel that the
Declaratory .J udginent itself needs to be interpreted.
ln the first plact-, it use:::; the word ''indebtednesses"
which would ref er to rnort- than one debt, but the Decree
( R. 38, 39) refers to onl~- one note and mortgage and
uses this language:
"Fl' IS FURTHER ORDER1£D, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that the Defendant shall assume, pay and discharge all of the outstanding
family obligations of the parties hereto, including
the outstanding note and mortgage upon the home
property owned by the parties."

By it:::; Declaratory Judgment, the lower Court has, once
again, completely changed the provisions of the Decree.
'rh words "outstanding note and mortgage" have been
ehanged to "indebtednesses" and, if we understand the
~ourt correctly, the Appellant is to be made to stand half
of not only the ''outstanding note and mortgage upon the
l1ome property'' but also half of "all outstanding indebtPdnesses against the residence" even though the Respondent was ordered to assume, pay and discharge all of the
dPbts, including the "outstanding notP and mortgage upon
the home property owned by the parties."
'l1he record shows that tlwrP was only onP mortgagP
Jebt on the home pro1Jerty wheu the Dt>cree wa:::; signed
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and entered, that L<~ing u\w Fed<~ral S<·curitY ln 8ura 11 t:l'
Company. (R. Hi, 9G, 294) and tlH· Court it~Plf at pag1·
9G of the Record on Avpeal rt>ferred to "th<· t>xistino
b
debt" thereon. However, Re81Jond<~nt ltas now 8ougltt
to mtroduce a new, separatt> and distind "enct1111lna11c""
against the homl' in thl' form of a pro111i880l'!' note sig1wd
by the parties to J. K Crofts & Sons (H. S5, Sfi) and
which was not secured by a mortgagP. lndPed, H<·spomlrnt through his courn;el :-;tipnlat<·d (R. :2~J-!) that wht-n tliv
divorce ·was granted th\:'I·e was only one lllortgag<' again~t
the home property filed of n·cord and that this was to
.F'ederated 8Pcurity. He tlwn conknded, however, that
there was a note signed by the parties to J. K Croft~
and Sons, which was for lllah~rials and labor that \\·pnt
into the home. Certainly, it would torture thP Dt•en·p
beyond recognition to hold, as ap1mrentl!· thP lo\\'Pl' Conrt
bas now done, that this was a rnortgagP on tltt• h01w·
property, particularly in view of tlw fact that thP Deen"l'
refened to only one lllortgage, being thP on!:' to b'ed!:'rair'd
Security Insurance Cornpan!-, and the Hespond!:'nt wa~
ordt>red to pa,\' all falllil!· dPhts, including that notP and
mortgage. One of the debts ht> ·wa8 thus and tlH·rPh:·
ordered to pay was tlw note to ,J. l~. Croft8 and Soni->, hut
now he s<·<'ks to hav<· tli<• Ap1H'llant pay half of tlw sanw,
and bY using th<' wonl in tlw plural SPHH' ( imkhted1wsses0) it appears that thP lcnn'r Court, ('ith<·r inkntionaUy or inadYPrkntl!T, has g01w along: with his <'Ollt<'ntions.
'l1he Declaratory .Judg111Pnt is nm·Prtain, ineornplek
and indt>finik in that it <loPs nut SlJPll out Pxaetl.\' what
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i:,: lwing- refened to in thi::; connection. Nor doe::; it ::;tat!:'
when or in \\'hat mann!:'r ''equitie::;'' are to he dett>rmined.
'l'ltP:,:l' questions 1Jl"l'8ent themselve::;:
(l) ln vie\~ of tl_1e order that Re::;pondent pay all
debt::;, mcludmg tlw mortgage on the family
home at Panguitch, are "equities" to be determined by deducting from the grm;::; sale price
whtm the propert)r i::; sold the costs of ::;ale~ If so,
then after making ::;nch deduction, the net proceeds wonld be di,,ided P(piall:· since the propPrty
is held hy the parties as joint tenants.
( :2) \i\Then the home is sold, are "equities" to be de-

termined by deducting at that time the costs of
::;ale and all of the balance the 11 remaining dne
Federated Security Insurance Company on its
mortgage loan'? We a::;::;ume that Respondent has
kept up the payments to Federated and that the
present balance is ::;nbstantially less than the
amount due in October and November, 19G2. On
the assumption that he continues to make thP
pay:nwnts to Federated, the mortgage debt will
be still le::;s when the property is sold.
We cannot believe that Respondent seriously contPnds that the obligation to .J. E. Crofts and Sons should
hl' deducted in arriving at "equities." Actually, this debt,
onp of those as:mmed by Respondent and which he agreed
to pa)· and discharge, matnred April 30, 1966 (Exhibit
"('" following R. 91) and we assume it ha::; been paid
punmant to the Decree of Divorce, but whether or not it
has bPen paid, it is clearly a debt Respondent was ordered
to pay as one of "all of the outstanding family obligations" and certainly was not a mortgagP dPbt agaim,;t the
liol!H' hut ~\\'as llH='rely an unsecnn='d note of the partie::;.
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We cite Pic1so11 c. Hall, 18~ ~o. ()/~l, US l•'Ja. W±, aud
Des Mui11es Joint Stock La11d Ba11k 1. Alln1, llil NW 9U.
~20 Iowa -1-!S, in ('OilnPttion with this point.
The Declaratory .J ndgrnent is tl<ofretivv in not ddPrmining vVHEN or ho\v "<'quities" an· to ht• detPrmirn·d.
Vv e feel that point must be clea1'ed up. TherP an_. thni
lJOSsibilitit>s, namely, ( 1) only costs of sale arP to lw
deducted in dt>termining "Ptluities" in tlw home; (~I
"equitil's" al'(' to lw detPnuined h.v dl·duding t'rolll gro~'
salt> proct>eds the cm;ts of salt· and tlH· amount due Fedrated when the Decree was entered; or (3) "t:>quities" an:
to be determined by dt•ducting front gross ::mle procet>cb
from the home property the costs of ::mle and the halanrP
remaining dne Federated Secnrit:· Insurance Compan)
at the tirne of sale. We sulnnit that the first possibility
i::- the correct one since Rt·spondPnt was ordl·red to pa)
th(:' mortgage debt. If tlH-' howP had been sold tlw da.1
after the Decree was enten•d, it was Hespondent's duty to
pay the mortgagP debt in full. To hold otlwrn-iti<' would
mean that Ap1Jellant would hP pa:·ing 01w-half of a dt>ht
Respondent was order<'d to pa:·. rrlu· Court's direction
that he pay "all" of the dPhts, ineluding this one, wonld
thereby hl'couie meaningless.
Even if tlw "equitiPs' 'are dd(-'J'lt1i1wd at tlu· tiuw 11!
sale hv deducting costs of :-,;ale and thP balam·P r(:'ntainin~
due
that tirnc to E'ederated it \\'ill ml·an that Appellant
is heing requin~d tlwreby to pay orn·-lialf of the tiaid nmaining dPht and that tlw langtiage of thl~ DP('I'(~e is being
ignort'd h(•eallS(' H<·spond(•nt is not lwi11g n·qnin·d tu IJU)

at
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all of the ialllil!· ohligation::o, including thi::o one. The word
'eq1titi1•s" must he interpreted in the light of all provi.~ions in tlw DPcree. It is fundamental that the Court
illltst give t-ff ect to each and every provision in the De1·rPI', in the light of and with relationship to each other.
If tl1i:-; i,; donl', thPn tlw lowPr Court's interpretation, WP
:-;nlm1it. i,; ohyiousl~' incorrect.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT THE AMOUNT OWED BY RESPONDENT TO
APPELLANT AS OF THE DATE OF ITS DECLARATORY JUDGMENT WAS $4,563.84, AND IN ALLOWING RESPONDENT CREDIT FOR $1,271.14 AND
$350.00 RECEIVED FROM THE SALES OF APPELLANT'S INTEREST IN A SALT LAKE CITY HOME
AND A PANGUITCH PASTURE OWNED AND HELD
BY THE PARTIES AS JOINT TENANTS.

At tlH~ tinH· the DecreP of Divorce was dated and
1·ntrt>d (Oct. lG and Nov. 5, 1962, respectively) the parties
11·ere the ownPrs as joint tenants of certain pasture prop1·1-ty in Panguitch, Utah, adjoining their Panguitch home
1•ropPrt!', and \VPre entitled to funds from the sale by
ll11·1t1 of a Salt Lake City home held and owned by them as
,joint t1•nanb (R. 81, 178, 179, 258, 259, 302). Respondent
a:< joint tnans (R. 81, 178, 258, 259, 302). Respondent
<"iaim1·d crt>dit on the $10,000.00 awarded to Appellant
\'or th1• smn of $1,271.14 representing Appellant's one\1alf ot' tlw final payment on the sale of the Salt Lake City
l10111P and also for the sum of $350.00 representing onehalf of thP sal<· price of the Panguitch pastnre, which
one-half was hPr own pro]l<'rty. Th<~ lowPr Court allowPd
th:<(· as propi·r 1·rl:'dits on tlH~ auwnnts due nnder the
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Decree of Divorce in dPt('nniuing tlw rwt balante remailling due by Resvondent to Appellant on the $10,000.0U,
which balance was determined without charging R~
spondent with an:· interest whah;oever on thP $10,000.0U
amount ou either the theory that it was a judgnwnt
bParing interest from its date at ~% or that at the nry
minimum interest was dm~ on and as installmenb matured and become payable thereon h :- \-i rtue of the realization by Respondent of profits frow business intl>rest1
held by him or of gross sales prncePds from the sale of
business assets.
In other words, the Appellant has been charged and
the Respondent has bern credited ·with vroperties and
amounts actually owned by the Appellant ·when the Diyorce was granted. The Decree of Divorce does not
justify or permit under any possible logical construction
any such result. There would have been just as mncl1
logic and reason to charge Appellant and to Credit Respondent with any other itt~m of property such as an
automobile, jewelry, or any other asset owm•d b:-· App<'llant at the time of the Divorce whether or not or whenever the same was sold by her and tonvt>rtt•d into cash.
The Decree of Divorce does not mention at any point nor
does the Pntire Record on Appeal which is the compMt·
record, ref er in any way to Panguitch pasture, the ownership or disposition thereof, or the halante dm-· from tlw
imle of the Salt Lake City home owned by the parti<'~
as joint tenants. The Panguitch property adjoined the
J'anguitcl1 horn<' JH'Opl·rt~- hel<l hy the parties as joint
t(•nanb and wl1iel1 \1·a:-: onkn·d (·ontint\('<l in St[('lt joint
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n1·n;hip u11til sold. The ~alt Lak(• City home held in
joint te1rnm·y until sale had been sold and the proceeds
wen· payablP to both of the parties. The Decree did not
tah awa~· from th!:' Ap[H'llant any property in her name
11r already ownPd by her, and this would include the
Pang·11ikh pasture and tlw balance on the Salt Lake City
liom1·, but tlw lower Comt, b~· its Declaratory Judgment
lias now seen fit to change the Decn•P of Divorce and to
tah awa.' from tlH· Ap1H'llant part of her property by
1·harging Respondent with receipts from the sale of her
own prnpPrt)·. CPrtainly this was not contemplated by
t!H· Decn·P and was not even mentioned. The Court's
Deelarator~· .J udgnwnt hy its eff Pct and b.'· the allowancP
ur thPse credits, introduces entirely new items into the
action, and, wornP still, takes from the Appellant and
gives to the Respondent part of thP Appellant's property.
nil without an,\ ('onsich·ration whatsoever.
1111

'rhPre was sowP evidene\~ l'P lativ(• to thesL· particular
itPnts at onP of tlw lwarings on the Petition for Interpretation of the DecrPe, sincP Resj)OndPnt had claimed them
in thv nnverifiPd, incomplete and erroneous accounting
iiP had filed with tlw Court (R. 87, 88, and 89), thesP
particular it!:'ms lwing listed as thP second April 10, 1963
itPm in tlw amount of $1,271.lG and as the third April
10, 19();3 i h•111 of $350.00. Such Pvidence was completely
i11eo11clusiw in that Appellant stated that she received
hoth pa~·111!:'nb and gave lwr eoo1wration in the sale of
tltP Panguiteh pastnn• with thP understanding and on
1hP eondition that tht>y did not appl.'' on tlH• $10,000.00
:111ard (I{. J/,'-i, 17~J.

:m'.2.

:~)();{) a11<l tlw Jfr~pondP11t tP~ti-
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fied to tlw (·untrar:· ~H. :2:-):2-2()(), irwl.). \\'(• frel tliai
eertainl:· the App('llant\.: te:-;tii11011.\ i:-; rntitl(•d to lllll('li
more eredPnCP, lwcam;(' it l'\'Pllll' onl:· logieal that sl1t·
would not b(• allowing or agTePinµ: to a crPdit on thi·
$10,000.00 from tlw sale of lwr own properti(•::;. :She had
n11 t<ndivided one-half intPl'Pst as a joint tenant in tlH·~1·
properties and in tlw l)}'Oee('ds then•frorn and th!:';;(• intt>rests WPre jn:st a:s much pro1wrty right;; \'Psted in hPr
as were items of pro1wrty :separatd:· lwld or owned
by her, whatt•ver they might han· lwt•n, at the tirne of
the Divorce .
Furthermore, it 1:s an elementary principh· of la11
which requires no eitations of authority, that e\·pn if
she had agreed to any :such applif'ation and credit, whirli
we vigorously dispntP and d<:>ny, no con:sideration for an)
such agreement, credit or application was paid h.\' lk
spondent or rPceived b:· A]Jpellant, \\·ithont \Yhieh an1
such agreement would fail and he void.
The entire matter, furtlu·n11on·, is n•1110ved from any
peradventun-· of doubt by th(• l'Xpn·;;:,; wording of th~
Decree of Divorc<' itself which state:s ( R. ;)9) that th~
"Plaintiff shall be award<:>d the total sum of $10,000.00,
which shall he paid by the Defrndant to the Plaintiff
out of profits arisi11g from business i11tcrests held by tlw
Defendant" ... and ... out of the sale of lntsi111'ss assets
of the Defendant to third parties . ..... 'J'he award of
$10,00000 (vlus interPst) was vayahlt•, therl'for, out of
Dt>fendant's profits from hi~ prop('rty and out of the
sale of his husinl'~S as~wt~. 'l'o wab· tlii~ arnotrnt or <lllY
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part of it pa,\·alJJp out of Appellant's lJl'Operty i::; a trave;-;ty \\'hi('h should not hP countenanced by any Court.
F'mthl'rmore tl1P Decree stated that the settlement was
of "the rights of the Plaintiff in the property of t-he
Dcfrndaut'" (R. :i9) and it wa::; not a ::;ettlernent of Plaintiff's rights in her own property nor did it award the
Re::;pondt'nt an_,. righb in the propert~· of the Appellant.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING
RESPONDENT TO ACCOUNT TO APPELLANT AND
TO SUPPLY HER WITH DATA COVERING THE
SALE OF BUSINESS ASSETS, DATES AND
AMOUNTS INVOLVED, DATES OF RECEIPT BY
RESPONDENT, AND SIMILAR DATA WITH RESPECT TO PROFITS RECEIVED BY THE RESPONDENT.

By the term::; of the Deeree of Divorce quoted above,
it wa::; ::;pecificalJ~· vrovided that the $10,000.00 was payabl(' out of profits received by Defendant-Respondent
from bnsiness interests held by him (all of said profits)
an<l wa::; immediately due out "of the sale of business
assets of the Defendant to third varties and actual ret·eipt by tht- Defendant of said sale proceedings" with
thP further provision that payments out of gross sales
1n·oct-t-ds were to be at the rate of 50% thereof (R. 39).
l~wn if it wert- lwld that this $10,000.00 award was not a
.iud6'11lt-nt. ht'aring interest which we respect.fully contrnd would ht- erroneous there is no possible doubt but
11 hat intt-rt>st would start accrning when and as Re~pondent n•ceived profits from business interests or
"gross salt-s in·o<·t-eds" fro111 salP of hnsiness assets to
third partiPs. It follows, tl1t•refon·, that A1Jpellant is
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l'lltitlt>d to know the <·xad dates, a11101mb and otlwr dat~
with rP::-;lJect to sud1 profih; and sal<·s. Appellant sough!
at tht:> first hearing on h\:'r PPtition to ltav<' tlw Court
order that Respondent he requiu•d to submit a halane1·
:::heet showing assets when the Deel'<'<' wa::-; entered, in
order that there would ht> a beginning point and slw could
then detennine whethl'r or not profits had lwPn rPalized
from ::-;uch husine::-;s interests or ::-;alPs then·of had bet·n
madt:>. 1'lw lower Conrt rt>fnsed this n•qtwst, which wa.'
l'\:'!)eated a number of times (R. G8, fi9, 70, 71, 7:2, 7:3, 74.
75). Snb::w<11wnt dforts wen-' also mad<', hut to no avail.
By its Amended Dt:>cision, the lower Court recognizPd
(R. 315) that at thP very least the Appt:>llant ·was entit!Pd
to interest from the respectiYe dates payments hecauw
due to her by virtue of the receipt by Respondent of
business profits or gross sall·s proceeds, and specifically
directed as follows :
"The Defendant is therefore reqnin<l to supph
Plaintiff such enabling data."
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lair
( R. 316, 317, 318, 319) the lower Court almost complete!)
reversed its field by stating (R. 318) that the $10,000.00
amount was payable "out of profits arising from the sal~
to third parties of business interests held by the Defendant" hut then again rewn;ed itself by saying that
fi0% of the gross sales proceeds of business assets which
\Vere actually distributed to and rPceived by tlw Defendant were to he paid to th(• Plaintiff irnmediat<:>ly bnt not
earlier;" and cornpldei)' ig-norPd thP effect of the r<"alizat ion of lrnsi1wss lJrnfits n·quiring pa:·rnl'11ts to appl: 011
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tlw $10,000.0U award. ln it:,; Conclnsiorn; of Law (R. 319)

Court affinnatiwly found that no interest was
<ltH' 011 tlw $4,563.84 prior to the actual receipt by De1Pndant of those amounts." This did not define what or
\I hieh amounts \\'\-']"(' hPing n"ft.rred to, nor is there any
l'inding as to when an.\ sn<'li amonnts \\'Prt' rPalized and
~tartPd to lwar interPst.
tlt\' lo11·pr

At the ver;.· worst and mo::;t unfavorable interpretat ioll of tlH· DPcrPe irn;ofar as Hespondent is concerned
11·itl1 n•spPct to said $10,000.00 arnonnt, payments thereon
111ahll'Pd and interest started to accrue thereon whenever
und in whatevPr stuns RPspondent received either profits
from business interests lwld b~· him (which would indttd\' intt>rest, dividends, profits frorn the operation of
his own business assets, distributions to him by partnerships or corporations of profits, etc.) and whenever he
rPalized gross sales proceeds from selling business assets,
50% of which gross sales proceds ·wonld be payable to
,~ppellant.

By its Declarator» Judgment, the lower Court ignored cornpletPly the duty to pay out of business profits
and changed without any possible justification the pro1·ision relative to paymt>nt ont of 50% of "gross sales
prnePPds" hy sa.Ying that tlw payments were due only out
of "'profits from the sale of business assets." There
is a gTPat deal of difference hetwPPn "profits from the
~alP of bn::;inPss assPts" and ''gross salPs proceeds." By
appl~·ing tlw Iath•r, it drH'sn't rnatt<>r \l'l1dhPr then· is a
jJrofit or Joss 011 tltt> sale. B.\ applying the former, sale
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price would bt' ignon·d and a d<·knuination would hi·
made of "profits" or "gain." Indet>d, RP:,.;pondent hai
endeavored in hi:,.; Accounting (R. 90) to twist "gr 08 ,
receipts" from sales into one-half of long-tPnu capital
gain.
At no time has Appellant had tlw bem·fit of an
accounting by Res1Jondent of profits from bu:oine:,.;:,.; interests or of gross salt's proeeeds from lnrnines:,.; assets.
The lower Court reeognized her right to :,.;uch an Accounting, but then entered a Dt>claratory Judgment and made
oral Orders which completely depriw her of :,.;uch right.
In order to s1wll out what Appellant dl'sired and
was entitled to under any pos:,.;ible interpretation of the
Decree of Divorce, she served on Re:,.;pondent a Reque8t
and Notiee (R. 148, 149, 150, 151) :,.;etting forth a li:,.;t of
the documents which would disclose profits and gros~
sales proceeds, specifically listing information and docnments desired. The Respondent refused to a1Jply these
items and the Court -would not make an order ret1niring
him to do so. Appellant's rights to an accounting to
disclose information to which she was clearly entitled
and her right to documents solely and exclusively within
the knowledge and po:,.;session of the Respondent hav1'
been ignored and circumvented hy thP RPspondent and
by the lower Court.
CONCLUSION
Appellant r<>spectfully {'Onh•nds that the so-called
Declaratory .JudgrnPnt of tht• lower Conrt be reversed
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and alte1wl to provide that the $10,000.00 award in favor
oJ' Appellant was a judgment bearing interest at 8%
1wr annum from the date it was entered and determining
1l1P correct amount due thereon; that the Court determinP that "equities" in the home property at Panguitch
be defined to mean gross sales proceeds less expenses
of sale and that the net proceeds thus determined be
ordered paid equally to the parties on the sale of said
!tome; that the Court disallow Respondent credit on the
$10,000.00 award for the sum of $1,271.14 and $350.00
111entioned in Point Ill; and the Respondent be required,
in the event the Court rules that said $10,000.00 award
\las not a judgmPnt bearing interest at 8 per cent per
annum from its date, to account for the dates, amounts
and sources of all profits from business interests and
gross proceeds from sales of business assets since the
decree and that a determination then be made of the
correct amount due Appellant after applying each payment first to interest accrued to the date thereof and the
balance to principal.
J{espectfully submitted,
.\IATTSSON & JACKSON
151 North Main
Hichfield, Utah
GUSTIN & RICHARD~
1610 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APPENDIX
lN

'l'HJ~

DIS'l'Rll'T COURT OF

GARFIELD COlTN'l'Y, STA'L'E OF UTAH
MARY

IR~'l'A

CROFTS,
p la i II ti ff.
- VS -

.JOSIAH HOYT CROF'J'8,

DECREE OF
DI\TORCE
CIVIL NO. 18SI

Defe11dwd.
This matter eamP on for 1H.~aring bPfore thP Court.
the Honorable Ferdinand Erickson, District JndgP, pn·
siding without a jury, on the Hitl1 da:· of October, A.D.
1962 at Richfield, Utah, upon tlw complaint of the Plain·
tiff, and upon th~~ General AppearancP, Waiver and
Agreement of the Defendant on fik 11PrPin. ThP Plaintiff
appeared in person and by h<'r Connsd 'l'Px R. Olsen of
the Law Firm of Ols1•n and l'hamh1..•rlain, and the D('·
fendant did not appear in iwrson or by coimst>l and it
appearing that the DPfondant had been duly served witl1
a copy of thP eornplaint and that ]I(' had rnt<•rPd a O<>neral
j . ppearanee, \iVain'r andAgrPl'lll<'Ilt, wlH•reinlte withdl'P\I
his answer and elPeted not to pk•ad to thP complaint o!l
file hPrein, and eonsented that a <kfanlt be taken agaim;t
him and the rnattPr h1· ~-wt down for h<>aring at an:· tiuw
conveniPnt to tlw Court an<l in any <·01mty of th<· Statl'
of Utah; th<' Plaintiff' lia\·ing intr0<lt1<·<·d <·viclPn<·<· i11 ~1111·
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port of thP complaint, and the Court being fully advised
in tlH· pn•rnises, and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fad and Cone]m;iom; of Law, now therefore,
fi1 IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
D1£CRKI£D that the Bonds of Matrimony heretofore ex-

i:-;ting between Plaintiff and Defendant be and the same
an• hereby dissolved and the marriage relationship between the Plaintiff and th1• Defendant be and the same
i:-; lwrehy terminated.

lT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECRE1£D that the Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties
lwreto, to-wit: Richard Ray Crofts, a son, age 16, and
Tina Marie Crofts, a daughter, age 15. Expressly awarding the Defendant the right to visit said children at all
reasonable times and places.
I'L' IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
D1£CREED that the Defendant shall assume, pay, and
discharge all of the outstanding family obligations of
the parties hereto including the outstanding note and
mortgage upon tht' home property owned by the parties.
IT IS FUR'l'HER ORDl£Rl£D ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff
as temporary and pennanent alimony the sum of $150.00
1wr month and the further sum of $150.00 per month
for the support of the minor children of the parties
lwrdo, wliieh alimony and :-;tqJport payments shall eom111Pn<"l' on or lwfon· the lUth <la.\· ot' l\o\·emlier l!:Jli~ and
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shall continue until the minor childn;n individually reach
their ages of majority. In the event a child reaches the
age of majority, the support money herein provided
shall be reduced $75.00 per month. Also in the event of
re-ma,rriage of the Plaintiff herein, the alimony provided
shall terminate.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the Plaintiff is awarded as a permanent,
complete and final settlement of her right::; in the property of the Defendant, the total sum of $10,000.00, which
sum shall be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff out
of profits arising from business interests held by the
Defendant and which IJrofits are actually distributed and
received by the Defendant and shall be i11nnediatPly due
and payable out of the sale of business assets of the Defendant to third parties and actual receipt by the Defendant of said sale proceeds. Said amount shall be payable
at the rate of 50 per cent of the gross sale proceeds until
said $10,000.00 has been paid in full. Further, the Defendant shall have the option of prepaying any part of
the amount provided herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED ANll
DECREED that the Defendant shall assume and pay all
Court costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection ·
with this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED ANll
DECREED that the Plaintiff is awarded possession of
the 1961 Pontiac sedan automobile, together with the
furniture and furnishings owrn~d hy thP parties hereto
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now in the home of the parties in Panguitch, Utah. ]j-,urther, the Plaintiff is awarded the possession, use, and
oecn1iancy of tl11:• horne and home property owned by the
parties located in Panguitch, Garfield County, State of
Ftah, and specfically described as follows:
'l'he East 4o2 feet of the South 6 chains of the
Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of
Section 29, Township 34 South, Range 5 West,
Salt Lake M(:'ridian, containing 4.2 acres, more or
less. The East 5 chains thereof being in Panguitch
Town Survey.
Which vossession is to be held by the Plaintiff so long
as she desires to use said home for personal living. In
the event the home is sold to a third party, the equities
realized from the sale of said property are to be equally
divided between Plaintiff and the Defendant. The home
property shall be continued in joint ownership between
the Plaintiff and Defendant until said ownership is terminated by a sale to a third party as is herein provided.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
D~CREED that thl:' Decree of this Court shall become
final within three months after the date of its entry
upon the records and from the filing hereof with the
Clerk of the above entitled Court.
DATED this 16th day of October, A.D. 1962.
s/

jj-,ERDINANDtRICKSON
District Judge
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